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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.
Case No.

15,511

DENNIS LOVELESS,
DefendantAppellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal appeal where the defendant Dennis
Loveless was charged with and convicted of the crime of
aggravated sexual assault pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A.
(1953, as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was tried on September 14, 1977, before the
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge.

The jury returned a

verdict of guilty to the crime of aggravated sexual assault,
a felony in the first degree, pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A.
(1953, as amended).

On the 13th day of October, 1977, the

~onorable J. Duffy Palmer entered judgment and pronounced

sentence thereon.

Judge Palmer sentenced the defendant-

appellant to a term of five years to life in the State

Pri~on purs1iant to §76-3-203(1) relating to first degree
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felonies.

Defendant-appellant appeals solely from the

judgment and sentence of the Court and not from the convict:
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-appellant reguests this Court to vacate
the judgment and sentence of the trial court and to remand
this matter with directions to enter judgment and pronounce
its sentence pursuant to §76-3-203(2) relating to a second
degree felony and not as to a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As appellant is appealing only from the judgment

a~

sentence of the Court, the facts as to the conduct of the
appellant regarding this crime are not in issue.

Suffice

i

i:l

I
to say, that the defendant was charged and convicted by a
jury of having intercourse with a woman not his wife under
the age of 14.

The indictment was brought under §76-5-405,

U.C.A., Aggravated Sexual Assault, as the laws of the State
of Utah stood February 6, 1977.

Aggravated sexual assault

is a felony in the first degree.

The sentence of the Court

was pronounced on the basis of a first degree felony.

hl

that time, the crime of rape, §76-5-402, u.c.A., (1953, as'
I

amended), also included the exact conduct with which the
appellant was charged.
degree.

Rape was a felony of the seco~

Copies of the statutes as they stood in February

1977 are attached in the appendix.

The 1977 session of the

Utah Legislature amended these two sections to remove this
inconsistancy.

These amendments did not go into affect
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until after April 1, 1977.

Copies of these sections after

the amendments were made are also attached in the appendix.
POINT I
\VHERE THERE ARE TWO STATUTI::S WHICH PROSCRIBE THE SAHE
CONDUCT BUT IMPOSE DIFFERENT PENALTIES, THE VIOLATOR IS
ENTITLED TO BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LESSOR
PENALTY.
The appellant was charged in the information upon which
he was convicted with the following specific conduct:
On or about the 6th day of February, 1977,
at Farmington, County of Davis, State of
Utah, the above defendant did have sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife,
to wit:
Brenda Winnett, under the age of
14.
( R. 1).
The information denominated the crime being charged as
Aggravated Sexual Assault, pursuant to §76-5-405, U.C.A.
The conduct described in the information, however, is
proscribed in identical terms by two separate statutes as
they existed in February of 1977, when this act took place.
The two sections are the section on Aggravated Sexual
Assault, 76-5-405 (Appendix page 1), and the section on
Rape, 76-5-402 (Appendix page 1).

The very words describing

the defendant's conduct in the information are the words
used by the rape statute and the consent statute to define
rape.

7he rape statute, 76-5-402, states:
A male person commits rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent.
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11

\H thout her consent" is defined in ri 76-5-406 ( 7)

(ApDendi;

Page 3), as when:
(7) The victim is under 14 years of age.
Rape under these circumstances was a felony in the
second degree, §76-5-402, U.C.A.
The exact same conduct was also defined as aggravated
sexual assault pursuant to 76-5-405, U.C.A.

(Appendix page
I

The pertinent language from that section is as follows:
76-5-405 AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULTA person commits aggravated
( l)
sexual assault if:
(b)
The victim of a rape •
is under 14 years of age.
That section, however, describes this conduct as a felony•

1

the first degree.
The conduct with which appellant was charged was thus,
prohibited by two statutes in identical terms, one making
the conduct a felony in the second degree, the other makii·
the conduct a felony in the first degree.

There is, of

course, other conduct defined by the aggravated sexual
assault statutes which is not included in the rape statute.
The inforr:iation with which appellant was charged, however,:
specified none of the additional conduct proscribed by HE
aggravated sexual assault statute.

In fact,

the conduct

described by the infornation used the wording of the rape
statute and not the wording of the aggravated sexual assac
statute.
The law in Utah is clear that where the same condJ.
proscribed by two statutes which would impose different
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1

1

penalties, the defendant is entitled to be sentenced
according to the lesser penalty.
Ra~mell

The recent Utah case of

v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) states this

premise clearly.
Proceeding to the main issue in this case;
we agree with petitioners premise that
where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled
to the lesser.
560 P.2d 1108.
That case dealt with charges under the Utah Controlled
Substances Act which overlapped to some extent provisions of
the Pharmacists Act.

The Court in that case concluded that

the conduct proscribed by the one was not identical to the
conduct proscribed by the other and that the Controlled
Substances Act applied more specifically to the conduct with
which the defendant was charged than the Pharmacists Act.
The Supreme Court also pointed to a provision in the Controlled Substances Act that specifically required the Court
to apply the Controlled Substances Act when there appeared
to be any conflict with the Pharmacists Act.
In the instant case, the conduct with which the defendant is charged is identically proscribed by two statutes.
One making the conduct a felony in the second degree, the
other making the conduct a felony in the first degree.

When

the defendant was sentenced, he was sentenced by the trial
court as follows:
It is the sentence of the Court that Dennis
Loveless be committed to the State Penitentiary to serve a period of from 5 years to
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life.
(Transcript, page 9.
'I'he recorcl
has not been numbered by the Clerk beyond
the 1st page of the transcript which is
numbered, record page 8.)
This sentence was imposed pursuant to §76-3-203(1), U.C.A,
( 1953, as amended) which states in pertinent part as folio .
(1)
In the case of a felony of the
first degree, for a term at not less than
5 years and which may be for life;
The sane code section provides the maximum permissible
penalty for a felony of the second degree as follows:
(2)
In the case of a felony of the
second degree, for a term at not less than
1 year nor more than 15;
The sentence imposed by the trial court could not havi
been imposed if the Court were sentencing pursuant to the
second degree felony conviction as required by Rammell v.
Smith, supra.

This Court should remand the case to the

trial court for re-sentencing as a second degree
pursuant to §76-3-203(2).

felo~

See also State v. Fair, 23 Utah

2d 34, 465 P.2d 168 (1969) and State v. Shondell, 22 Utahi
343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969).
As a post script, it might be noted by the Court that
in the 1977 session of the Utah State Legislature, the
duplicate nature of the two offenses, aggravated sexual
assault, and rape, were corrected.

(See Appendix page 21·

The conduct charged in the information woul.:l now come onlY
under the rape statute and would no longer fit under the
aggravated sexual assault statute.

The rape statute,

however, has also been amended to include both first an:
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second degree felonies.

?hese amendments took place after

the date of the conduct with which the appellant is charged.
CONCLUSION
The exact conduct with which defendant was charged and
convicted was proscribed by two separate statutes;

one

:r:ul;ing the conduct a felony in the second degree, the other
making the conduct a felony in the first degree.

The trial

court sentenced the defendant pursuant to a felony in the
first degree.

The sentence the trial court meaded out would

not be permissible if it were sentencing pursuant to a
felony in the second degree.

Under these circumstances,

this Court should remand this case to the trial court for
re-sentencing pursuant to §76-3-203(2) U.C.A. regarding
sentences for felonies in the second degree.
Respectfully submitted this

2 ]+h

day of December,

1977.

CKS N H
OWARD, LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
llAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County Attorney, Davis County
Courthouse, Farmington, Utah
IJl·c'('rnl>er,

84025, this

27i-~

day of

1977.
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.....,
From 1973 Pocket part to Volume 8 U.C.A. - In effect u
nt1

amendments from 1977 session of JJeg1s
· 1 t
a urc> v1ent into e'.:.
(Sometime after April 1, 1977) .

. 76-5-402. Rape.-(1) A male person commits rape when he has sexual
inkrcourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent.
(2) Rape is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-402, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-402.

76-5-405. Aggravated sexual assault.-(1) A person corumits aggra·
vated sexual assault if:
(a) In the course ·of a rape or attempted rape or forcible sodomy or
attempted forcible sodomy:
(i) The actor causes serious bodily injury lo the victim; or
(ii) The aCtor compels submission to. the rape 01· forcible soclomy
by threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodil.Y injury to be in·
flicted i=inently on any person.
·
(b) The victim of a rape or atternpled rape or sodomy or attempted
sodomy is under fourteen years of age.
(2) Aggravated sexual assault is a felony of the first degree.
History: C. 1953, 7&-5-405, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-405.
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From 1977 yellow supplement to Volume 8, U.C.A.

In effect

sometime after April 1, 1977.

76-5-402. Rape.-(1) A male person commits rape when he bas sexual
intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent.
(2) Rape is a felony of the second degree unless the victim is under
the age of 14, in which case the offense is punishable as a felony of the first
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-4-02, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-402; L. 1977, ch.
86, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amenJment ndJeil "unles:> the
victim ~ • • .first degree" to subsec. (2).

76-5-405. Aggravated sexual assa.ult.-(1)
vated sexual assault if:

A person commits aggra-

(a) In the course of a rape or attempted rape or forcible sodomy or.
attempted forcible sodomy:
(i)

The actor causes serious bodily injury to the victim; or

(ii)

The actor compels submission to the rape or forcible sodomy
by threat of kidnaping, death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person.

(2)

AggraYated sexual assault is a felony of the first degree.

IDstory: C. 1953, 76-5-405, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-405; L. 1977, ch.
86, § 4.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amendment deleted former
•obd. (I) (b) \<hich read: "The victim of
a r:'lpe o:- :dtcmpte<l Tilpc or soclomy or

atteaq)teJ
sodomy is under fourteen years
1

of

f'.g11.'
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From 1977 yellow supplement to Volume 8, U.C.A.

In effect

prior to date of crime hecein and not amended by 1977 sess.
of Legislature.

· 76-5-406. Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual abuse without consent
of victim-Circumsta:nces.-An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual
abuse is without consent of the victim unclel' any of the foUowing circumstances:
(1) When the actor compels the victim to submit or participate by
force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances; or
(2) The actor compels the '·ictim to submit or participate by any
threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution;
or
(3) The victim has not consented and the actor knows the v1ctim is
unconscious, unaware that the aet is occurring, or physically unable to
resist; or
(4) The actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect, the
victim is at the time of the act incapable either of appraising the nature of
the act or of resisting it; or
(5) The actor knows that the victim submits or participates because
the victim erroneously believes that the actor is the vict.im's spouse; or
(6) The actor intentionally impaired the power of tlie victim to appraise or control his or her conduct by administering any substance
without his or her knowledge; or
(7) The 'ietim is under fourteen years of age.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-406, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-&406.
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